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JN Tl!I: SU PR HIE COURT OF TllL STATE OF UTA!! 
SEARLE B!WTllERS, a partnership, 
DIAMO?iD llILLS ~!OT.LL, a partnership, 
RANCE W. SEARLE, RHETT A. SEARLE 
and RANDY H. SEARLE, 
vs. 
EDLEAN SIARLE, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 15604 
BRIEF ON APPEAL OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
*********** 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case involves ~n appeal from final orders of 
the lower Court, Honorable David Sam, Judge, dismissing 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint with prejudice and holding that 
a prior judgment of the same Court, Honorable George E. Ballif, 
Judge, Case No. 5790 (Searle vs. Searle), is res judicata as 
to the claims of these plaintiffs and appellants as to an 
interest in real property, these plaintiffs and appellants not 
having been parties to said Case No. 5790. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was submitted to the Court on stipulated 
LLL'ts and memoranda of authority. From an order dismissing 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the p1:iintiffs' J\mendcd Complaint 1-,itli prejudice, plaintirrs 
appeal. 
RU.Ill SLlllC:llT m; i\Pl'i: \L 
Plaintiffs and appe1 Ll!lts seek reversal of the Lo1ver 
Court's orders dismissing plaintiffs' /\mendeLl Complaint with 
prejudice, wherein plaintiffs sollght a determination of their 
ownership in real property and a partition of that interest. 
STATL\lf'lff OF F:\CTS 
This matter was submitted to the Court below on 
stipulated facts for a determination as to whether or not the 
Judgment of the Court in a prior case, to which plaintiffs were 
not parties, is res judicata as to the claims of plaintiffs in 
the matter now before the Court. (~linutc Lntry dateLl ~lay 3l, 
1977, R-G7) These agreed facts as shown by the pleadings and 
memoranda of counsel demonstrate that plaintiff SEARLE BROTJIERS 
is a partnership consisting of plaintiffs RANlT IV. SEJ\RLE, 
RHETT A. SEARLE and RANDY B. SEARLE. Searle Brothers Partner-
ship, is in turn a 50% owner of another partnership, Di.amond 
Hills ~lotel. The other 50% interest of the Diamond Hills ~lotel 
Partnership is owned by WOODEY B. SEARLE. (TR 134, Case 5790; 
R-114). WOODEY B. SEARLE is the father of the indiviclual 
plaintiffs, RANCE \\1. SEARLE, RllETT A. SE:\RLE and RANDY B. SEARLl 
and the defendant EDLEAN SEARLE is the motlwr of o;uch plaintiff' 
(R-35, 68). l\'OODEY B. SEARLE and clcfencLrnt J:llLEAN SEi\RLI:, 
previously husband and 1'ifc, \H'rc divorced by llccrce of the 
- 2 -
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l!intah c:uunty District Court elated ~lay 17, 1973. (R-105-113) 
On January 16, 1967, the real property in question 
l1creinaFtcr referred to as the "Slaugh House" 1vas purchased 
and pai'l for hy check 1101384, drawn on the account of the 
partnership, lllMIOND IlILLS ~IOTEL, but the deed to the property 
was inadvertently prepared showing WOODEY B. SEARLE as the 
grantee. (Def's. Ex. #12, Case No. 5790; R-118; TR-243, 249, 
260, Case No. 5790; R-115, 116). 
The books and records of DIM!OND HILLS MOTEL partner-
ship have, since 1967, shown the "Slaugh llouse" to be an asset 
of that partnership and all rentals therefrom up to the time 
of the divorce decree between WOODEY B. SEARLE and EDLEAN SEARLE 
were divided equally between WOODEY B. SEARLE and the plaintiff, 
SEARLE BfW'J'HERS partnership. (Def's. Ex. #12, Case No. 5790; 
R-118). 
During or about the year 1972, EDLEAN SEARLE commenced 
an action for divorce against WOODEY B. SEARLE in the District 
Court of Uintah County, State of Utah, Case No. 5790, the 
l!onorable George E. Ballif, sitting as Judge. EDLEAN SEARLE, 
in the divorce action, claimed that the "Slaugh House" was an 
asset of the marriage between her and WOODEY B. SEARLE, which 
position was disputed by WOODEY B. SEARLE, who claimed the 
"Slaugh llouse" to be the property of the DIM!OND HILLS MOTEL 
partnership and thereby 50% thereof was actually owned by 
SFl\RL[ RJWTilERS partnership, the plaintiff in this action. 
(Jlcf';;. Lx. 1!12, Case No. 5790; R-118). The Court, in the 
- 3-
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divorce action, chose to adopt the; position ol E!JLLl\N ,<;J:/\IU,E 
and a1varded her the "Slaugh llou::-,e" <ls part of ht~r dis tr i liut ive 
share of the marriage assets in the Decree of Divorce. 
(Paragraph 2(d) Decree of Divorce, C:ase No. 5790; R-107). 
Neither party to the divorce action, nor the Court, 
moved or ordered that the SEJ\RLL BROTHERS partnership or the 
other plaintiffs herein be made parties to the divorce action 
although the plaintiffs and appellants in this action were 
within the jurisdiction of the Court and service of process 
could have heen obtained for that purpose. Plaintiffs in this 
action, RHETT A. SEARLE and RANDY B. SEARLE, did testify in 
the divorce GJction concerning their interest in the DIAMOND ll1Ll 
MOTEL partnership, but neither was interrogated specifically 
about the "Slaugh House". (TR, Case No. 5790, 196-204, 261-263) 
Based on this record and indicated facts, the Court 
below ruled that the plGJinti ffs' interest in the "Slaugh !louse" 
was foreclosed by the Decree of Divorce in Case No. 5790; that 
said Decree was res judicata as to these plaintiffs; and that 
in any event the claims of the plaintif [s to the "Slaugh House" 
were barred on the grounds of collateral estoppel. The Court 
below thereupon dismissed the Amended Complaint of the plaintiff 
with prejudice. (R-80, 81-82, 85-86). 
It is from these orders that plaintiffs appeal. 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGU0IENT 
POINT 1 
TIIE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THl\T THESE PLl\INTIFFS 
AND APPHL1\N'fS WERE BOUND BY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IN CASE NO. 
5790 (SEl\RLE VS. SEl\RLE), UINTAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, THESE 
PLl\INTIFFS AND APPELLANTS NOT BEING PARTIES TO SAID CASE NO. 
5790. 
The orders of the Court below, being summary in nature 
and based upon stipulated facts, these facts as alleged in 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and as hereinabove set forth, 
must be considered as established for the the purposes of this 
appeal. (Frederick May & Company vs. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 
P. 2d 266) Thus the questions on appeal are reduced to a 
determination of whether, as a matter of law, such facts compel 
a finding of res ju<licata and estoppel against these plaintiffs 
and appellants. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they do not. 
This Supreme Court in the case of Tanner vs. Bacon, 
(1'173) 
103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957, held: 
"It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata 
does not operate to affect strangers to a judgment. 
It only affects the parties and their successors in 
interest and those who are in privity with a party 
thereto. The word "privity" refers to a mutual or 
successive relationship to the same right or property. 
As applied to judgments or decrees of court, the 
word means one whose interest has been legally 
represented at the time." 
The foregoing principle of law has likewise been 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the cases of Colemen vs. 
\:utkovich vs. Summit County, 556 P. 2d 503; Bank of Vernal vs. 
- 5-
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ll_i_!l_t:_:"._l} ___ c:~Jlt~1_!r,_122_l_J~ith\ 1 U, 2 ,11 I'._ 'd ',~',I; ,\ki':11_t) \'~. l':Hks 
\'S._~oya_l_5;1g_ye __ J_~1,;uranL-c~c1111_11;111_iL·>·, ',(,[I'. :'cl ll~~-;_1'~·~1nion 
1 n s u r a nc_ l' _C~o_1_11p ;1 nLY_:' . JC'!_ CJl, __ Co_ l(l" 1-:1L i ()lln,_ S 7 __ 1 _I'. __ ~ <l__} c; ).'!_; a!ld 
tederal L;~_n<l Llank_Q.LJ~_e_t:_b_c'J:_(:_Y__\'_:::_:__ ~;1-'-~~'_,_ 8_'7 U_tal1 l_~Ci_, __ ~_8 _ _1_'__:__ 2cl 
480. The principle is also discussed in _Ll_'.1__11:1_11._~Tur._Zd__,_ 
paragraphs SlS-532. 
Some examples of privity are: J:xecutor with testator 
heir with ancestor; ass.ignec \v.ith assignor (hut not assignor 
with assignee); clonee with donor; and lessee with lessor. 
Privity means "derivative interest". (Hodgson vs. 
Midwest Oil Compai:!__r_, __ ~~Jyorning, 17 Federal 2d 71). The 
term "privity" denotes a mutual and successive relationship to 
the same rights or property. (T<~ylor vs:__!l_::ukcr~~t~ 534, 
262 P. ~_Q_). Plaintiffs take the position that at the time of 
the hear j ng of the di vo rec case be fore Judge Ballif, there was 
no privity between these plaintiffs in this case and WOODEY B. 
SEARLE. Their interests in the property in question 11·ere not 
mutual an<l were not the same. Plaintiffs do not claim any part 
of the interest of WOODHY B. SEARLE, but assert their own 
independent and separate partnership interest to so~ of the 
property involved, the "Slaugh House". 
It appears clear that partnership interests are not 
privy to each other. Such interests are separate and distinct, 
rather than successive ancl mutual, and, consequentlr, plaintiff: 
interests in the property in this case are not privy to the 
interests of \l/OODEY B. SE!\RLE. 
209, 209 P. 2d 387). 
-6-
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To further clcrnonstratc the point, partners arc 
cJi:1r;1ctcr·1 :·.cd as l:O-Ohners of specific partnership property 
undc r _?e~:~_i_si__1_1 __ 4ll_:-_l~ 2_?_(_lj__,____ll_tah_C:_'2_c~n__I_~!~1.tccl lCJS3, as amended. 
Such an interest is the exact opposite of successive or privy 
interests. In fact one partner may even have a lien on the 
partner:ohip interest of another partner. (0lartin vs. Carl isle, 
:'l_f2___Qkla_li_oma 268, 148 P. 833, 6 A.L.R. 154). 
The property in question, the "Slaugh llouse", having 
heen purchased with parinership money, it was a partnership asset 
irrespective of the fact that title was taken in the name of one 
of the partners, WOODEY B. SEARLE, (Fullmer vs. Blood 546 P. 
]_ll _ __()_O_ii_), and ll'OODEY B. SEARLE, as a partner, had no right to 
enlarge his interest in partnership assets by any statement 
which may have been attributed to him in the divorce action, 
nor did the Court in that divorce action have any power or 
authority to litigate and rule upon the interests of these 
plaintiffs in the property in question without these plaintiffs 
having been made a party to the divorce action. 
The defendant argued in her memorandum to the trial 
COllrt that since WOODEY B. SEARLE was a partner of these 
plaintiffs, he was also their agent for the purposes of receiving 
notice and taking action with respect to matters involving the 
specific partnership interests of these plaintiffs. While a 
partner is the agent of the partnership for purposes of partner-
ship business while acting within the scope of his authority, 
1:--cct iun 1\8-1-6 to 48-1-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended), 
-7-
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such agency cloes not extend hcyo11,\ p:1rt11(·1ship alfairs. The 
fact that a partner, \\(ll)JlLY 11. SJ:i\IZLI., 1:;1s sued for divorc·c 
did not make him an agent of the other partn('.t·s 1,·i th respect 
to partnership property, nor in any h·ay make the partnership 
or the other partners privy to the divorce action or in any way 
bound by the divorce decree. (!lillarcl vs_._l'l_c:.!'nigl_~_ supra.) 
With respect to the contention argued by defendant in 
her memoranJum to the Court heloh', 1vhich position was adopted 
by that Court, to the effect that plaintiffs herein sho11l<l now 
be estopped from making a claim against the property in questio 
because tl1e) cliJ not assert that claim in the divorce action, 
it is true that plaintiffs <lid have knowledge o[ the divorce 
proceeLling, but the lai" appears to be clear to the effect that 
actual knowledge of a proceeding 11hich might affect one's inter 
est in property does not necessarily cause one to be bound by 
a judgment in that proceeding (Bank of Vernal vs. Uintah Cotmty. 
supra), nor does the fact that one may have the right to inter· 
vene in such an action, bind one under a juclgmE>nt in that actio: 
if in fact one <loes not intervene (~6 J\~~~,__rar_~graph 53 
The Bank of Vernal vs. Uintah County case cited above 
appears particularly in point, since in tl1at case it was held 
that a witness who testified in the prior action, but was not 
effectively made a party thereto, 1vas not bound by a judgment 
therein. 
supra, an<l ~le Carty vs. _.£,'.~s_o;__v_O' ~--J-~y_:i_1 _ _Slo _1i e __ J_1_1_5_l_I r~n~_c_:_ .f~''.1.Cill_l_l' 
supra.) 
-8-
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The concept o[ cstoppel j111p1 ies tl1at someone has at 
one ti111E' taken a position or failed to take a position so as to 
c;u1se an innocent party to act in reliance thereupon and to 
therc::ifter seek to take a different position to the detriment 
of the innocent party. As stated by this Supreme Court in the 
case of ~Jorgan vs. Board of State Lands, 549 P. 2d 695, to-wit: 
"Estoppel is a doctrine of equity purposed to 
rescue from loss a party who has, without fault, 
been deluded into a course of action by the 
wrong or neglect of another. Estoppel arises 
when a party by his acts, representations, or 
admissions, or by his silence when he ought to 
speak, intentionally or through culpable 
negligence, induces another to believe certain 
facts to exist and that such other acting with 
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts 
thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the 
former is permitted to deny the existence of such 
facts." 
Plaintiffs' actions or inaction with respect to the 
divorce case between WOODEY B. SEARLE and EDLEAN SEARLE did 
not mislead anyone so as to require imposition of the doctrine 
of estoppel. There is competent evidence in the record which 
shows that the Court in the divorce case was apprised of informa-
t ion 1vhich showed that the "Slaugh House" was really a partnership 
asset in 1d1 ich these plaintiffs were interested. (Def's. Ex. 
1112, Case No. 5790; R-118; TR-243, 259, 260, Case No. 5790; 
R-115, 116). The fact that the Court in the divorce action 
apparently chose not to believe such evidence, does not show 
any inconsistent position on the part of these plaintiffs or 
111,Jil:ttt' jn any11·ay that these plaintiffs were trying to mislead 
either the Court of the defendant herein, FDLEAN SEARLE. 
- 9-
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Attention of the Court is Jirccted to the case of 
The L1cts of that case sho1,, a situation hherein the doctrine 
of estoppel should properly apply. I\ recitation of the facts o 
that case will demonstrate the di ffcrencc from the case n01v un<l 
consideration: 
"In suit No. 2888 Civil, defendant as O\vner of 
the Wright Waters sought an adjudication as against 
all claimants on the niver of the amount of said 
Wright Waters as well as its priority. Defendant 
employed Tanner as an adviser and consultant all dur-
ing the litigation. One of Tanner's duties was to 
advise and aid defendant in joining in said suit all 
parties which had, or might have, claims to water 
which might be affected by a decree in said suit. 
Defendant was seeking to set at rest every claim whic 
in anyway might inpinge on its rights as finally 
settleJ in the decree. Knowing this, plaintiff faile 
to notify defendant of his claim under Application 
4306-A which became Certificate 1310. Therefore, 
''hi 1 e p 1 a int i ff ' s rights uncle r J\ pp 1 i cat ion 4 3 0 6 - A 
(Certificate 1310) were not considered in No. 2888 
Civil, it was plaintiff J1imself who was at fault in 
not asserting them. As adviser to defendant he was 
bound to direct attention to all claims challenging 
either priority or amount of defendant's claims which 
might directly or indirectly injure or affect its 
rights. This he failed to do and thus estopped 
himself to assert his cla.ims later." 
The record in this case clearly shows that these 
plaintiffs did not do anything to mislead EDLEAN SEARLE or the 
Court in Case No. 5790 so as to support a claim for estoppel. 
The position of the plaintiffs in Case No. 5790 was indicated, 
but was ignored. The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not 
operate in favor of one who has knowletlge of the essential fact 
or who has convenient and available means of obtaining such 
knowledge. 
-10 -
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:t 
Ill 
_J'.,'J Kan-="il~-~~ll~li~~-~' cited in r-lorg0:~_-':'._~ard of 
~t_<1_t_(C~J_,_a~J~-2-__.?Ul)_ra). Defendant, herself, or the Court for that 
matter cou1d have rnacle plaintiffs herein parties to the divorce 
action in view of defendant's Exhibit #12 in that case (R-118); 
however, since that was not done, these plaintiffs are not bound 
by that decree in Case No. S790 (Rule l9[b], Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure). 
CONCLUSION 
If allowed to stand, plaintiffs' ownership interest 
in the property in question, the "Slaugh House", will have been 
terminated by a Decree of Divorce to which plaintiffs were not 
parties and under circumstances that do not justify such a 
result on a theory of estoppel. 
The orders of the Court below dismissing plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint with prejudice should be reversed. 
-11-
Respectfully submitted, 
A~~-u~c-{___jC-2{j,cac~-u-rJ Y: is tens en, for 
CHRISTEN, • , TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
SS East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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CERTTFIU\TL Of: ilJ:\l L lNr; 
Two copies of the foregoing Brief were mailccl, 
postage prepaicl, to Ray E. Nash, attorney for clcfenclant ancl 
respondent, 33 East tlain Street, Verna1, Utah 81\078, thi_s 
t;Jo-z;f day of March, 1978. 
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